Analyse the factors that contributed to the downfall of the Taipings.

The capture of Nanking in 1853 in one sense showed the boundless ambition and potential of the Taiping Rebellion. But in another sense, this victory marked the limitation of the movement, because just after it was achieved, the Taiping leadership made the crucial decision not to push forward with all their force towards Peking. They decided to consolidate their hold at Nanking and the Yangtse River region, and to send only one part of their force to Peking. This decision virtually saved the Ch'ing dynasty. The weak Taiping northern expedition was routed by the spring of 1855, leaving intact the headquarters and rallying centre of the Ch'ing Government at ' Peking. Although it took another nine years for the Taipings to be completely crushed, the Yangtse River valley remained the northern most limit of the "Heavenly Kingdom", leaving the Ch'ing with a sizeable part of its empire intact.

• 1)      Tseng Kuo-fan and the Ch'ing Efforts to Crush the Taipings

After the capture of Nanking, the Taipings concentrated their military efforts on securing the niajor towns and cities along the Yangtze River, from Wucha'ng in the West to Chinkiang in the East. Initially, the Ch'ing military response was entirely defensive. The Imperial troops set up two camps outside Nanking, one each on the north and south of the Yangtze River. But they could not prevent the Taiping troops from overrunning the nch prefectures on both the side^ nf the river. The demoralisea imperial troops with their antiquated organization were no match for the supremely motivated, crusading army of the Taipings.

 

When the Ch'ing Government finally woke up to this fact; they restored to desperate measures. This included in 1853 calling on an important official, Tsing Kuo-fan, who was on leave in his native Hunan province, to raise a militia force to challenge the Taiping rebels who were on an offensive there. Tseng loyally responded to the call, but he had his own ideas how to go about implementing it.

Tseng set about raising a force (known as the Hunan Army) that would be as tightly organized and as committed as the enemies it was to face. He carefully selected able scholar-officials as commanders, and they in turn recruited soldiers from among the local peasantry who would be loyal to them. In comparison with the soldiers of the regular army, these recruits were well-paid and thoroughly trained. They were indoctrinated to believe that they were defending their villages, their lands, their temples and the security of their lives from the marauding "bandit" armies. At the same time, 'l'seng Kuo-fan issued public appeals to the local population of all classes to assist in the rebel-suppression campaign.

 

Tseng Kuo-i'an's carefully thought out and executed strategy yielded dividends. Initially, the result of the encounters between the Taiping troops and the new Hunan Army did not significantly favour either side. Both s~des won or lost major engagements. However, the crushing defeat of the regular imperial forces camping outside Nanking in mid-1856 ensured that there was no other force thereafter to challenge the Taipings other than the new troops of Tseng Kuo-fan. In recognition of this, the Ch'ing Court enhanced the~authority and responsibilities vested in Tseng Kuo-fan. By 1860 Tseng, now given the exalted position of Imperial Commissioner and the complete command of all operations against the Taipings, commanded a fine army of 120,000 men and a galaxy of able commanders and strategists.

• 2)      Attitude of the Western Powers

Initially, the attitude of the Western powers in the treaty ports to the Taiping Rebellion was one of mild sympathy. The 1850's was a period of rising tensions between tht: Western powers and the Ch'ing government and there was no compelling reasonfor the foreigners to rush to the defence of the Ch'ing. Moreover, the fact that the Taipings ostensibly followed a form of Christianity was a factor in their favour.

,Officially, I~owever, the Western stance and particularly that of the British, was one of strict neutrality or wait-and-see. As long as their treaty rights, the treaty ports and the commerce were left untouched, the Westerns saw no reason to intervene.

 

• 3)      Internal Problems of the Taipings

The year 1856 which marked a high tide of the Taiping fortunes with the defeat of the imperial troops encircling Nanking, also saw a major crisis within the movement. Factional infighting among the top leaders dealt a blow from which it never recovered.

The East King, Yang Hsin-Ch'ing, had for some years sought to elevate his own position at the expense of his rival kings. Because of his undoubted military ability and skilful manipulation of spiritual matters (e.g. by lapsing into trances) he had by 1856 acquired a position second only to Hung Hsiu-ch'uan himself.

However, Yang aspired to replate Hung himself as the chief leader. He started ' making moves in that direction which were, however, quickly understood by Hung. Hung summoned the two other remaining kings, the North King and the Assistant King, to his rescue (the South and West Kings both having been killed in earlier campaigns). They killed the East King and butchered over 20,000 of his followers. But in the process, they fell out with each other, leading to the North King's slaughter of the Assistant King's entire family and followers. Disgusted with the North King's actions, Hung had himself executed barely three months after ~ang.'Hung also fell out with the Assistant King, leading to the latter's desertion with a huge number of followers.

 

At the end of it there was none of the original group of leaders left except Hung. Hung increasingly disassociated himself from official matters. Were it no).for the efforts of one of his last remaining lieutenants, Li-Hsiu-Ch'ing, it was quite likely that the Taiping cause would not have lingered on for the seven more years that it did.

• 4)      The Defeat of the Taipings

The end came on a 3-pronged movement under the overall direction of Tseng Kuofan. Tseng's brother was given charge of encircling Nanking. Li Hung-Chang was in charge of pacifying Kiangsu, while another commander Tso Tsung-Tang, was charged with the fighting in CheKiang province. Prior to this, the last major offensive campaign of the Taipings to the west was defeated in 1861.

By 1864, the troops loyal to the Ch'ing had met one success after another, and the position of the Taipings holed up at Nanking became untenable. Nevertheless, the defenders of Nanking fought down to the last man, with no one surrendering. The final taking of Nanking by Tseng Kuo-fan troops on 19 July, 1864 was extremely bloody, as were the subsequent mapping in campaigns. The armies of Tseng Kuo-fan were merciless in their victory, taking a toll of several hundred thousand people just in the last phase of the campaign.

 

At one time, it had seemed possible that the Taipings would overthrow the Ch'ing and succeed in conquering all of China. But their decline and fall was rapid. The eruption ot rierce rivalry among the Taiping leadership, leading to its virtual decimation in mutual fighting, was undoubtedly a key factor in its defeat. In the last phase of the rebelliqn, the Taipings were virtually without a centralized command structure. They were also deprived of the most talented commanders and organizers who had built up the movement from scratch.

The deteriorating quality of the Taiping leadership coincided with the revival $nd strengthening of the leadership of the Ch'ing forces. The formation of the new armies under the leadership of Tseng Kuo-fan and his proteges by pasing the old and ineffective military apparatus of the imperial troops, was decisive in the defeat of tht Taipings. The leaders of these forces had been carefully selected by 7'scng himself on the basis of their talent, ability and personal loyalty to him.

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