Svata Pramanyavada

 The controversy over the truth (prâmņaya) of knowledge in Indian Philosophy is well known. The main participants in this controversy (whom I have considered here) are the Mimāmsă and the Nyāya schools of thought.

The whole discussion centres round two questions: (1) what are the conditions generating truth? and (2) how is the truth of a knowledge known? For the Mimāmsă, both the generation and knowledge of truth are intrinsic (svatah), while for the Nyaya, both are extrinsic (parataḥ). So far as falsity is concerned there is no disagreement between the two. Both agree that both the generation and knowledge of falsity are extrinsic.

I do not propose to re-state here the arguments and counter arguments of the rival schools in defence of their own views, for such an exercise would be fruitless, I intend to analyse the positions of the contending schools and attempt a re-evaluation of their doctrines. 

I propose to consider in this regard the following questions:

(i) What is the nature of knowledge?

(ii) Is the classification of knowledge into true and false legitimate?

(iii) Is the question about the generation of truth meaningful?

(iv) Can the knowledge of truth be intrinsic? and

(v) Are the two theories of truth totally defective, or there is some element of truth in both which may be combined to formulate a more defensible position?

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